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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAVERNE H. LAWRENCE. * 
Plaintiff. * 
vs. * 
SECOND INJURY FUND * 
* 
Defendant. * 
I. JURISDICTION 
This action is brought pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated. 35-1-83 (1953. as amended 1987) which confers original 
jurisdiction in such motions for review on the Utah Court of Appeals. 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Petition is for review of a final order of the 
Utah State Industrial Commission. The Findings of Fact. Conclusions 
of Law. and Order by the Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission were entered March 4. 1987. A Motion for Review was 
filed by the plaintiff on March 18. 1987. which Motion was denied by 
Order of the Commission dated June 24. 1987. It is the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law. and Order as upheld by the Industrial 
Commission that is the subject of this Appeal. 
III. ISSUES 
Neither the facts in this case nor the findings of 
impairments are in dispute. The legal issue presented is one of 
statutory interpretation: Can Lawrence combine the permanent 
impairments resulting from separate industrial injuries with the same 
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employer in order to reach the 10% threshold necessary for 
compensation of pre-existing conditions neither caused nor 
aggravated by any of the industrial injuries, under the 1981 
amendments to Section 35-1-69, the combined injury statute? 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Neither the facts in this case nor the findings of 
impairments are in dispute. The legal issue presented is one of 
statutory interpretation and is identical to that presented to and 
decided by This Court in its recent Opinion filed March 10, 1988, in 
the case of Richard Otvos v Industrial Commission and Second Injury 
Fund, 78 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, (Ct. App. 03/10/88). In this case-as in 
Otvos-the applicant experienced two separate industrial incidents on 
separate dates while working for the same employer. The Medical 
Panel found that these two incidents which occurred September 10, 
1985, and November 29, 1985, respectively, resulted cumulatively in 
permanent partial impairment totalling 10%. That impairment was 
found by the panel to be allocated 3.3% to the industrial incident 
of September 10, 1985 and 6.7% whole-man impairment to the injury of 
November 29, 1985. The Medical Panel also found that the applicant 
had substantial pre-existing impairment. which was not related to or 
aggravated by either industrial injury. That pre-existing 
impairment was determined by the panel to be 15% whole-man 
impairment (combined to 14% through application of the Second Injury 
Fund statute 35-1-69). No objections to the Medical Panel findings 
were filed by applicant or by any of the parties. Accordingly, the 
Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order in which he adopted the Medical Panel Report and 
awarded applicant. Laverne H. Lawrence. (hereafter called 
"Lawrence") compensation for a 3.3% permanent partial impairment due 
to the industrial accident of September 10, 1985 and compensation 
for a 6.7% permanent partial impairment of the whole person due to 
the industrial accident of November 29, 1985. No compensation was 
awarded by the Administrative Law Judge to Lawrence for the 
pre-existing impairment which was neither related to nor aggravated 
by either the industrial accident of September 10, 1985 or that of 
November 29, 1985 because neither of the industrially caused 
impairments met the 10% threshold minimum requirements set forth in 
The Combined Injury Statute, Utah Code Annotated Section 
35-1-69(1)(b)(1987). Therefore, the award of benefits was 
restricted to the impairments caused by the two industrial injuries. 
On March 18, 1987, Lawrence through his counsel filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration (Motion for Review) in which he 
contended that all of his pre-existing impairment, including the 15% 
unrelated and unaggravated pre-existing impairment as well as the 
3.3% impairment resulting from the September 10, 1985 accident, 
became "pre-existing" to the November 29, 1985 accident and since 
the latter accident aggravated a portion (3.3%) of the pre-existing 
impairment then all pre-existing impairment properly should be due 
from defendant Second Injury Fund to Lawrence. This argument was 
rejected by the full Commission in its Order Denying Motion for 
Review issued June 24, 1987. The Commission affirmed the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order holding that the Administrative Law 
Judge as well as the Commission must look at each accident 
separately or serially, as done by the Supreme Court in the 
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Torqerson case 52 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (1987) and that since neither of 
the two separate industrial accidents caused permanent partial 
impairment amounting to 10%, there could be no liability on the part 
of the Second Injury Fund for the pre-existing impairment.. Lawrence 
then filed his timely Petition for Review with this Court on July 
27, 1987 asserting "that the Industrial Commission of Utah acted in 
error as a matter of law in its interpretation of Section 35-1-69 
Utah Code Annotated, and other statutory sections dealing with the 
apportionment of and payment of permanent partial impairment 
benefits." 
V. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The authority believed to be determinative of the 
issue in this case is Section 35-1-69(1)(b)(1987) as interpreted by 
this Court in the recent (March 10, 1988) Opinion in the Otvos' 
case. Supra. Other pertinent authorities, also referred to in 
detail in the Otvos Opinion, are Second Injury Fund v. Streator 
Chevrolet, 709 P.2d at 1180 upholding the validity of the threshold 
provision set forth in subsection (l)(b) of Section 35-1-69 and 
Richfield Care Center v. Torqerson, 773 P.2d 178 (Utah 1987), a 
holding consistent with the position of the Second Injury Fund in 
this case that injuries must be considered individually for purposes 
of determining compensation under the statute. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the position of the defendant that the decision 
of this Court in the Otvos1 case is wholly dispositive of this 
controversy. There is no dispute that Lawrence incurred two 
separate industrial injuries. There is no dispute that the 15% 
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pre-existing impairment was not aggravated by the either of the 
separate industrial injuries. The Medical Panel allocated 3.3% 
whole-man impairment to the injury of September 10, 1985 and 6.7% 
whole-man impairment to the industrial injury of November 29, 1985. 
No objection was raised with respect to either of those allocations 
within the time allotted by the statute and in fact no objection was 
raised with respect to those allocations in the Motion for Review 
filed in behalf of Lawrence. The Medical Panel Report was adopted 
by the Administrative Law Judge in its entirety and was also 
accepted in its entirety by the full Industrial Commission as 
evidenced by its Denial of Motion for Review. Accordingly, there is 
no valid dispute before this Court to the established facts that 
neither the September 10, nor the November 29, 1985 industrial 
accident resulted in a whole-man permanent partial impairment 
sufficient to qualify either accident for payment for pre-existing 
impairments under the threshold limits set out in Section 
35-1-69(1)(b). The only remaining issue is whether or not Lawrence 
can pyramid or combine the permanent partial impairments of the two 
injuries in order to qualify under the statute for Second Injury 
Fund benefits. That issue has been fully considered in all its 
aspects by This Court in its lengthy opinion in Otvos, which opinion 
closed with the following: 
Clearly then, if the legislature intended to allow for the 
accumulation of injuries under the 10% threshold 
requirement, it knew what language to use, as indicated by 
the language describing the 20% requirement. 
. . . however, he simply does not meet the 10% threshold of 
permanent physical impairment attributable to a single, 
relevant industrial injury and is therefore not entitled to 
compensation for the pre-existing congenital birth 
defects in his arms. Accordingly, we affirm the Order of 
the Industrial Commission. 
In summary, the above-quoted language from Otvos 
applies in its entirety to the claim of Lawrence in this case to 
Second Injury Fund compensation for his pre-existing impairment. 
Neither of his acknowledged separate industrial injuries meets the 
threshold qualification of the statute. Therefore, his claim before 
This Court properly should be dismissed. 
VII. ARGUMENT AND CONCLUSION 
It is defendant Second Injury Fund's position that no 
furLhor argumont by way of elaboration on either the facts, the law 
or the applicable statutory interpretations of This Court or the 
Utah Supreme Court is necessary-nor would it be helpful-in this 
case. The basic positions of Lawrence, both legal and equitable, 
have all been considered thoroughly in the Otvos case and, to a 
lesser extent, in the Streator and Torgerson cases. We now have a 
resolution from This Court which is consistent with the statute and 
is consistent with the decisions referred to above. It is the 
strong position of this defendant that any contrary decision in this 
case would result in complete turmoil with respect to our efforts to 
obtain a consistent interpretation of the combined injury fund 
statute and some consistent and reliable guidelines to be applied in 
determining qualification for benefits under the threshold 
provisions of that statute. It should be somewhat comforting for 
This Court to know that the Utah Legislature in its recent 1988 
session completely repealed Section 35-1-69 as it presently exists 
and that Second Injury Fund participation no longer will occur in 
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any cases other than permanent total disability claims. In other 
words, there will be no Second Injury Fund payments of any kind for 
pre-existing impairments, whether aggravated or unrelated, except in 
permanent total disability claims. However, this case still must be 
resolved under 35-1-69 as it reads at the present time and as 
interpreted by This Court in Otvos and Torqersen, along with the 
Utah Supreme Court's Decision in Streator. The holdings and the 
rationale of those cases applied to the undisputed facts and 
findings of this controversy require beyond question the affirmance 
of the Decision of the Industrial Commission and the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs Appeal to This Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of April, 1988. 
T^rie V. Boorfman 
Administrator for Defendant 
Second Injury Fund 
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